In this paper we analyze whether the use of credit risk transfer instruments affects the risk taking of large, international banks. Relying on a unique data set of European collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), we find that the issue of CDOs tends to raise the systematic risk (equity beta) of the issuing bank. We also perform a cross-sectional analysis to identify determinants of the change in systematic risk, and find that equity beta rises significantly more if the issuing bank is financially weak (low profitability and high leverage), and if it is domiciled in a bank-based financial system. Overall, our findings suggest that credit securitization goes handin hand with an increase in the risk appetite of the issuing bank. Our findings are also relevant for understanding the financial stability implications of credit securitizations.
Introduction
Since the late 1990s Europe has experienced a rapid development of its market for credit risk transfer. Recent reports from the British Bankers Association and the Bank for International Settlements estimate the global market for credit default swaps (CDS) at an all time high of 3 trn Euro (4 trn US$) in notional amount, and the market for asset-backed securities (ABS), especially collateralized debt obligations (CDO), at 220 bn Euro (260 bn US$). Europe has a 30% market share in both markets, and that number is rising. Several observers (Kiff et An empirical analysis covering the extent of effective risk transfer among market participants has not yet been carried out. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first empirical analysis of how risk transfer through credit securitizations affect the exposure of the issuing banks. Theory does not give a clear prediction about how risk transfer will affect systematic bank ownership risk. The net effect clearly hinges upon the replacement effect: if the risks that are transferred from the bank balance sheet are substituted by less highly correlated assets, then bank equity beta will decrease. On the other hand, if the risks transfer results in a higher diversification of the bank portfolio, the correlation with the market portfolio will rise, and equity betas will approach market beta. Therefore, if asset beta is below one, will rise; and will fall otherwise.
Recent investigations into the correlation between credit-linked notes have shown that structured finance products may well lead to an increase of the issuer's risk taking, also considered moral hazard (Instefjord 2005 ).
In a numerical study, Krahnen/Wilde 2006 argue that under certain conditions on the reinvestment of securitization proceeds, the issue of CDOs in true-sale transactions will lead to an increase in bank exposure to a market risk factor. This result assumes securitization issues are tranched, and the most junior (first loss) piece is always retained by the issuer, while issue proceeds are reinvested in a loan portfolio of similar risk characteristics. We then go on and identify the major determinants of beta change in Section 5. The analysis has to take into account the endogeneity of the issue type, e.g. synthetic or true-sale. The results of a two-stage estimation reveal that the changes in equity beta are driven primarily by two factors: the level of systematic risk, and the level of issuerprofitability. However, the type of transaction (synthetic or true-sale) and the type of underlying assets (corporate loans or mortgages) do not contribute to an explanation of beta changes.
On a more general level, we also find that the effect of credit securitizations on the equity risk of banks is significantly stronger for banks domiciled in countries with less developed capital markets, mainly continental European bank-based economies.
A possible reason for this finding is that the securitization of credit assets involves a capital market-oriented business model, which is an innovation in traditional commercial banking in continental Europe.
Hypotheses on ABS issues and bank risk exposure
The literature on how credit securitization affects the issuing institutions, and the banking system as a whole, is growing rapidly, although the absolute number of publications ). The focus of these studies is primarily on the implications of securitizations for financial stability. They contain a quantitative description of the market and conceptual work on the risk correlations and systemic effects. In an empirical study, Lehar (2005) estimates the correlations between the asset portfolios of international banks from the perspective of a hypothetical lender of last resort. In a related study, Nicolo/Kwast (2002) measure the correlations of stock returns between large U.S. banking organizations, and relate them to the ongoing consolidation activity within the U.S. financial system.
In a recent theoretical paper, Instefjord (2005) models a commercial bank that optimizes its credit market exposure, taking into account a derivative market that allows it to hedge its credit exposure and the expected cost of distress. Under the assumptions of his model, he finds that emergence of a derivatives market has two opposing effects on the net risk position of a bank. It lowers the risk because of improved risk sharing opportunities and, at the same time, it may raise bank exposure because of an increase in risk taking. Instefjord shows that competition in the underlying credit market determines the net effect on bank risk exposure.
Krahnen/Wilde (2006) argue that pooling and tranching of bank loans may lead to an increase in the systematic risk of the issuing institution, measured by bank equity beta. The rise of bank beta depends mainly on two features of the model. First, the risk level chosen by the bank for the funds set free in the process of securitization is nondecreasing, and second, the first loss piece is retained by the issuer. Both assumptions are plausible and correspond to anecdotal evidence.
In this paper, we will test the relationship between credit risk transfer and the resulting overall exposure of the bank. We use a large data set of CDO-transactions issued by listed European financial institutions, and included in Standard and Poor's (S&P) or Moody's deal list as of September 2004. We will use the bank's equity beta as the key variable, which measures the systematic risk of the bank's shareholders.
Our first hypothesis concerns a major motive for engaging in credit securitization, namely the off-loading of credit risk. Following the argument in the last paragraph, the net effect of credit risk securitization on the systematic risk of the issuer depends on reinvestment and retention decisions. We will therefore test whether banks are able to lower their market exposure by engaging in disintermediation through the sale of credit risk.
Hypothesis 1 A bank that issues collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), thereby shifting credit risk to investors, will decrease its systematic risk.
For analyzing Hypothesis 1, we will apply a time series -cross section estimation, using the standard event study methodology. To control for a possible correlation between error terms, which may arise due to clustering of issue dates, we apply seemingly unrelated regressions estimation. We report the results of the event-time regressions.
All results remain essentially unchanged when run in calendar-time instead.
Our second hypothesis concerns the determinants of equity beta changes around CDO issue announcements. This will be a cross section regression with the beta changes First, banks may be capital constrained due to regulatory pressure. Under the current Basel I regulation, and in contrast to the upcoming Basel II rules, the weights attached to corporate or retail loan portfolios are not risk weighted. This makes a typical securitization transaction potentially valuable for firms that are equity scarce, or that are struggling to meet their minimum equity requirement. The capital relief is due to tranching, i.e. the creation of subordinate tranches that carry most of the default risk of the underlying loan portfolio.
Given that the most subordinate tranche, the first loss piece, is retained by the issuer, and the senior tranches are sold, capital relief is evident under Basel I (Allen/Gale 2005). Thus, the concentration of risk in a first loss piece, combined with the sale of the mezzanine and the senior tranches, as is typical for the transactions we are considering in this paper, will lower the required equity capital. Firms that engage in securitizations in order to circumvent regulatory pressure are likely to reinvest the funds generated through the transaction in a way that increases the rate of return, thereby possibly affecting systematic risk as well. Such an analysis of the portfolio loss distribution, often carried out by quantitative credit risk teams in banks and advisory institutions, invariably transforms the traditional lending business from a relationship-based into a more market-based transaction. This may have an impact on typical lending decisions, like approval of credit lines, volumes granted, and prices charged. We expect that the strengthening of these market-driven valuations, for the purpose of serving the needs of investors, may lead bank management to increase its exposure vis-à-vis market movements.
Therefore, intensifying the link to the capital markets is likely to weaken the classical properties of relationship lending: insurance against adverse developments on the firm level. This leads us to hypothesize that banks with more traditional lending businesses will experience a stronger effect on their systematic risk once they start to securitize their loan book. The reason is that securitizations are seen as signals of an increase in expected market exposure.
Hypothesis 2 The effect of securitization announcements on the issuer's systematic risk is stronger (i) for banks in poor financial condition, i.e. with a low pre-issue rate of return and a high degree of leverage, and (ii) for banks that are characterized by relationship lending rather than transaction-oriented lending.
Besides the variables mentioned in the hypotheses, we will use as control variables the type of underlying assets (whether mortgage-backed securities (MBS), CLO, or other assets), the type of transaction (whether true-sale or synthetic), and the level of profits.
We will also control for a possible endogeneity problem concerning the transaction type.
The next section will lay out the data set and its descriptive statistics. For carrying out the event study, we define an estimation period of 100 trading days before and after the event window, where we set the event window at 20 days before and after the announcement date. Three events in our sample are too close to the end of our sample. In two cases the same originator issued two transactions on the same day.
We treat those as one observation. From the remaining 173 transactions, we delete all master-trust transactions, except the initial transaction under a master-trust, because the announcement of a sequence of issues is expected to produce an announcement effect only once. The final sample consists of 159 transactions issued by 49 banks. We use these issues for the analysis of changes in systematic risk in Section 4.
Descriptive Statistics
Before turning to the analysis of a possible change in the systematic risk of originators through an ABS-transaction in the next section, we will provide a brief description of the European banks undertaking an ABS-transaction in the period from the be- According to market participants, an important characteristic of the transaction is whether it is true-sale, or synthetic. From Panels 2 and 3, large and profitable banks prefer to use synthetic transactions, while true-sale issuers have a lower rating and a lower beta. In line with the argument on regulatory arbitrage presented in Section 2, we find unconditionally that issuers of synthetic transactions tend to have higher leverage than true-sale issuers.
In addition, Table 1 presents information about the characteristics of the ABStransactions in our data set. The average transaction size in our sample has a nominal Variables in the first column are defined as follows: Size measures total assets in bn Euro, profit is operating income as the difference between sales and total operating expenses. Equity Ratio is the ratio of common equity to total capital. Rating is the rating of the originator according to Fitch, Moody's or S&P, beta is the systematic risk of the originator, relying on the pre-event period, using daily returns from Datastream, transaction size is the amount of assets in the securitized portfolio, diversity score is a measure of portfolio volatility provided by Moody's, portfolio rating is the rating of the portfolio provided by Moody's, and credit enhancement is the size of the guarantee by the originator according to the new issue reports. The columns report the mean, the standard deviation, the median and the range (minimum and maximum value).
N Mean Std. the number of assets in the underlying portfolio, which is far larger than in true-sale transactions. The portfolio rating is almost the same for both sub-samples (BBB and BB+). Finally, the credit enhancement, which is assumed to equal the size of equity piece plus cash guarantees, is significantly larger for true-sale transactions (3.93% vs.
2.87%).
Event study on ABS issue announcements
Our first hypothesis, which was motivated earlier, relates the effects of securitization to the systematic stock market risk of the originator measured by the beta.
It will be estimated by Equation 1:
where R it and R M are the returns on security i and the market portfolio, defined as the log return minus log German interbank one-month lending rate, FIBOR (EURIBOR calculated over the entire window.
The announcement dates are defined using several data sources; the main source being the pre-sale reports of the three major rating agencies. Further identification is based on a keyword search in the Lexis/Nexis database. Following standard practice, the announcement date is defined as the last trading day before publication. On average, The maximum number of overlapping estimation periods in our data set is three, which is observed only once (Deutsche Bank in the year 2000). To deal with frequentissuers, the dummy variable D af ter can assume different values. Without any overlapping event in the period [+20;+120], the variable is equal to one. In case of one overlapping event, we set D af ter equal to two for the relevant interval, and similarly for any further overlapping interval. Due to the overlap of event windows, we estimate our model as a system of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) (see Zellner (1962) ).
The SUR methodology increases the efficiency of the estimation in that it accounts for correlations between the error terms.
The estimation is based on the full sample of 159 transactions. Table 2 . The average increase of beta is estimated at 0.024, which is significantly different from zero (p=0.02). The sign of β i suggests that banks engaging in ABStransactions simultaneously increase their exposure to the market factor. Since the coefficient captures the average increase in systematic risk per overlapping event, the risk-increasing effect of asset securitizations is higher for repeat issuers than it is for one-time issuers.
The basic market model specification is Model I. There is no significant abnormal return either in the event window or in subsequent event windows, if the whole sample is considered. Most importantly, the key variable in the model, β i , turns out to be significant and positive, refuting Hypothesis 1: A bank that issues collateralized debt obligations, thereby shifting credit risk to investors, does not decrease its systematic risk. To the contrary, its systematic risk tends to rise.
The remaining columns in Table 2 provide some robustness checks for the base model. Model II adds a second market return factor, which captures the performance of the European banking sector (DJ EURO STOXX FINANCIALS). The reason for adding this index is that there may well be an industry-specific trend of increasing systematic risk in banking that drives our β i effect, in addition to the general market Thus, the beta-increasing effect of securitizations is more relevant and more visible for institutions that engage repeatedly in securitizations, probably because these large financial institutions are more likely to systematically alter their loan portfolio as a consequence of their access to the capital market. The results are confirmed if we replicate these test statistics applying a calendar-time methodology, again using the SUR-methodology. We find (results not reported in the paper) that the coefficients and the levels of significance are quite similar to the ones reported in Table 2 . Overall, the beta increasing effect of securitization announcements appears to be robust.
In a further robustness check, we estimate the effect of securitization announcements on the unsystematic risk of issuing banks. For this purpose, we estimate the effect of securitization announcements on the volatility of the equity yield. 
The cross section of systematic risk changes
In the last section, we found that credit securitizations tend to go hand in hand with an increase in the issuer's systematic risk. This in itself is a relevant finding, given the widely shared belief that banks engaging in credit risk transfer eventually want to achieve a reduction of their risk exposure. Now, risk comes in many forms, and it is a-priori unclear what type of risk is supposed to decrease.
In the preceding section, we have addressed one measure of risk, the systematic risk.
We believe this to be a major type of risk from the point of view of regulators and shareholders alike. According to the notion of equilibrium asset pricing, it is systematic risk that is being priced on a competitive stock market. Furthermore, systematic risk implies a default risk for the financial system as a whole (systemic risk).
In this section we will analyze the determinants of the changes in systematic banking risk triggered by the announcement of credit securitizations. We will briefly review some candidates for such an explanation, referring to the recent literature when possible, and will then translate these explanations into a testable hypothesis.
A recent paper that discusses the effects of an emerging secondary loan market on the risk-taking behavior of financial intermediaries is Cebonoyan/Strahan (2004). They identify institutions that are aggressive users of the secondary loan market, both on the buy and on the sell sides. The authors show that the strongest change in risk-taking behavior is positively related to the use of the secondary loan market. Both the size and the complexity of institutions (i.e. as a bank holding institution) are determinants of the change in systematic risk.
We employ the following set of explanatory variables. The first set is the type of underlying assets, which serves as a proxy for the markets in which the originator is active. Offloading risk and freeing capital through securitizations will generate demand for new investments in the relevant field of expertise. We will therefore control for two asset classes, leaving the remaining third class as the reference group. These two asset types are collateralized loan obligations and mortgage-backed securities.
Second, a basic taxonomy differentiates between true-sale and synthetic transactions.
While the former leads to fresh money inflows at the level of the issuing bank, the latter does not have a cash flow effect. For this reason and based on numerical studies, Krahnen/Wilde (2006) predict that beta will change more in true-sale issues, all else the same. We will proxy for issue type by introducing a dummy synthetic.
Third, a major reason banks give for tapping the market for credit risk transfer is to get capital relief, i.e. to offload risk and to get around regulatory constraints that otherwise would hinder the bank from entering into profitable business ventures.
We will use two variables that capture potential difficulties the bank may have with regulatory constraint, or with poor performance. The variable equity ratio stands for the gearing the bank has achieved, keeping in mind that the regulator sets a minimum standard here. A second variable proxies for bank performance, by using the return on equity of the originator.
Finally, as was explained above, and as is discussed in much of the theoretical literature, the off-loading of credit risk may hamper the underlying client relationship between a firm and its banker. However, a recent study by Gande/Saunders (2005) that looks at the secondary loan market in the U.S. cannot identify any detrimental effect of loan market involvement on relationship banking characteristics. Now, our data set offers added value here, since it not only covers a different segment of the risk transfer market (e.g. asset-backed securities), but it also covers originators in different financial systems. Thus, while the U.S. and the U.K. are typically seen as the prototypes of financial systems where capital markets, rather than commercial banks, play the major role in corporate financing, the reverse is true for continental Europe.
Germany, also in the data set, is often seen as the polar case, as it is said to have a strong relationship orientation in the financing of corporations (King/Levin 1993 and Allen/Gale 1995).
Empirical Design
The empirical design to test our hypotheses on the effects that determine the rise in systematic risk consists of running a cross-sectional regression of β i on a set of explanatory variables. The general model is described by the following equation:
characteristics of the originator, transaction− specif ic variables)
We can summarize our discussion in the last few paragraphs by stating the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 The change of systematic risk, β i , caused by issuing a collateralized debt obligation, is (i) increasing in the size of the issuing institution, (ii) increasing in equity-ratio, (iii) decreasing in issuer profitability, and (iv) smaller for banks in marketbased financial systems.
The literature claims different effects of credit securitization on the risk exposure of the originator. On the one hand, banks are seizing the advantage of an improved risk management, and may choose higher risk exposures, for instance, by operating with greater financial leverage. As a consequence, the equity yield may rise, together with the systematic risk of the originator. On the other hand, securitizations will allow the bank to transfer risk to investors, thereby decreasing systematic risk. Table 3 attributes labels, definitions and the construction of all regressors. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics of the regressors used in the estimation.
Descriptive Statistics
As mentioned in Section 3 the cross section data set is reduced by three transactions, either because we were not able to generate balance sheet information for the originator (Mizuhno Bank and Nordea), or the originator was listed or delisted in the year of the transaction so that no balance sheet information was available for that year (Abbey National and BHW Bausparkasse).
This reduction is not accompanied by a significant change in the data structure. On this account, we discuss only the variables that are not explicitly explained in Section 3.2.
Looking at the assets backing the transactions in our data set, we find in 42 cases The average portfolio size is 1,898 m Euro, ranging from 100 to 12,500 m Euro.
The financial situation of the originator is captured by its profit (as a control variable), averaging 2,941 m Euro, while the return on equity serves as the indicator of firm performance, with an average value of 13.25% and a standard deviation of 10.58%. A proxy for the capital structure is the fraction of common equity. The ratio of common equity to total assets is, on average, 5.49%, with a median of 3.71%.
Finally, we are interested in the domicile of the originator, especially with respect to a separation between a "bank-based" and a "market-based" financial environment.
Therefore, we define a dummy variable labelled financial system, which equals one for issuers domiciled in the U.S. or the U.K., and 0 otherwise. Of the sample, 83% is from continental Europe, and 38% is located in Germany. The remaining 17% of all transactions are from the U.S. or the U.K., "market-based" financial systems. 
Baseline Results
We now turn to a discussion of the results reported in Table 5 .
Model I is our base case. It regresses the change in beta around the announcement of a CDO issue on the list of explanatory variables, discussed before. We find that among synthetic issues, the change of beta is negatively correlated with the equity ratio. For firms that engage in a synthetic issue, systematic risk rises with leverage. Thus, the less financially constrained a bank, and the higher its equity ratio, the more it uses the risk transfer market to increase market risk.
We also find that the return on equity variable has a negative coefficient and is highly significant. A low return on equity is accompanied by an increase in the bank's beta. This low return may be caused by relatively high loan loss provisions, which, in turn, may reflect a risk increasing lending policy.
The financial system dummy variable (which equals one for issuers domiciled in England or the U.S.), has a negative coefficient. It suggests that there is less change of systematic risk for both firms and banks after a CDO issue in countries with broader access to capital markets.
We also observe that the coefficient of beta as an independent variable is negative and highly significant, implying that the change of beta is decreasing in the level of beta, i.e. for low (high) pre-issue values of beta, the subsequent beta increase is strong (weak).
Finally, we find a positive coefficient associated with the variable synthetic. This is a surprising result, since the simulation exercises carried out elsewhere suggest the opposite (Krahnen/Wilde 2006). However, the type of issue, synthetic or true-sale, is a choice to be made by the issuer, thus making the variable endogenous.
In order to control for the possibility of endogeneity, we re-run our estimation as a two-stage regression. On the first stage, we model the choice of the type of transaction, using synthetic as the dependent variable, and the variables in column 2 as independent variables. This is a standard procedure, first suggested by Maddala (1983) , that allows us to get rid of a potential correlation between regressors and the error term.
Model II sheds light on the first stage choice between synthetic and true-sale issues, a decision taken by the originating banks. Since we have included the first stage regression in order to find residuals that are uncorrelated with the major regressors in the second stage regression, and since we have not formulated an explicit economic model in selecting the set of regressors, but have rather chosen to include basically all variables in the system, we will not interpret the coefficients at great length. However, the choice seems to be driven mainly by the type of underlying asset (negative for MBS), by the level of the issuer's systematic risk (low beta banks choose true-sale), and by the business model of the bank (high fee income banks prefer true-sale).
Replacing the synthetic variable in the base model with the residuals of the first stage regression yields the results reported in column 3. Interestingly, the new residual synthetic variable is no longer significantly different from zero. Besides the reduction in the relevance of the issue-type variable, all other coefficients keep their signs and remain significant. The only remarkable change refers to the financial-system variable, financial system. This variable increases in absolute value, and the p-value rises as well.
This latter observation underscores that there are significant differences between continental European and Anglo-Saxon banks with respect to the change of beta following a securitization.
Conclusion
This paper looks at a recent episode in the development of the European financial system: the emergence of a market for (loan) asset-backed securities and its impact on bank behavior. On the role of credit risk transfer markets, our study identifies two new insights.
The study is based on 159 issue decisions by 49 international, listed banks in Europe (including U.K.) and the U.S. Contrary to what many observers believe, we can show that banks active in these markets tend to increase their exposure to a market risk factor. This effect is statistically and economically significant, implying a rise of the average/median equity beta from January 1997 to December 2004.
Second, we make a first attempt to explain why banks change their risk exposure when entering the securitization business. This is an important question, since it goes at the heart of what banking is all about. After all, banks and capital markets are seen by many-including theorists and practitioners-as complements to, or sometimes even competitors for producing and delivering financial services to corporate and retail customers. In this spirit, the advent of markets for bank loans and for collateralized loan obligations challenges perceived wisdom about the specialization of banks (see, for example, Diamond (1991)).
Our cross section regression has yielded two major insights. First, we find evidence that the securitization of debt provokes banks to change their (systematic) risk inversely proportional to their financial performance, where weakness in our model is equated to a low return on equity, and a low equity ratio (Model III). In other words, financially weak firms increase their systematic risk by more than financially healthier firms, everything else equal.
Second, again everything else held constant, the increase of beta is significantly larger for banks domiciled in continental Europe as opposed to the U.K. or the U.S. Since the latter two countries are considered to be market-based economies, one may infer that the emergence of credit securitization exerts a risk-increasing effect, particularly in those countries that are traditionally bank-based, and for which the advent of securitization is a more profound innovation than for their peers in market-based economies.
Clearly, these last reflections are somewhat speculative at this stage. On the other hand, the CDO markets, where banks, hedge funds, and pension funds are increasingly active, is perhaps the best laboratory we can imagine to study what essentially differentiates intermediaries from direct market interaction. The research agenda is wide open here. We are aware that the current study can't offer but a primer on how hybrid financial systems, where banks and markets interact heavily, will work.
